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CHALLENGING OHIO’S ADAM WALSH ACT:
SENATE BILL 10 BLURS THE LINE BETWEEN
PUNISHMENT AND REMEDIAL TREATMENT OF
SEX OFFENDERS
Daniel J. Schubert∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s, sex offender registration laws at both the
federal and state levels have continuously been passed with impunity and
little opposition. Also, since the early 1990s, the sex offender registration
laws have continuously increased the scope, scale, and registration
requirements.
The 127th Ohio General Assembly passed Senate Bill 10 (“S.B.
10”) on June 27, 2007, and the Governor of Ohio subsequently signed the
bill into law on June 30, 2007.1 S.B. 10 was enacted to amend, among other
chapters, chapter 2950 of the Ohio Revised Code in order to bring Ohio sex
offender registration laws into compliance with the Adam Walsh Child and
Safety Protection Act (“Adam Walsh Act”).2 The Adam Walsh Act is a
piece of federal legislation that increased the severity of sex offender
registration and classification, requiring more strict and stringent
supervision of people convicted or adjudicated of sex offenses.3 The Adam
Walsh Act requires that states comply with its provisions within three years
of its enactment; if the state fails to comply within three years, then the state
will lose ten percent of the funding allocated for that year and for each
subsequent year the state fails to comply.4
Congress also added a financial incentive to encourage the states’
prompt compliance.5 If a state complies with the Adam Walsh Act within
two years of its enactment, it can receive a bonus of ten percent in federal
funding. This has caused some states, such as Ohio, to rush legislation
through before the deadline. Given such haste, it is unclear whether the
Ohio General Assembly adequately considered the constitutional

∗

Student Author.
S.B. 10, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2008), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.
us/BillText127/127_SB_10_EN_N.pdf.
2
Id.
3
See generally Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120
Stat. 587 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991 (2006)).
4
Adam Walsh Act §§ 124-25.
5
Id. § 126.
1
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implications of passing a law that retroactively increases punishment6 for
sex offenders. Also, it is doubtful the Ohio General Assembly considered
whether such punishment would have any effect on protecting the public
from sex offenders. Further, it is questionable whether the cost to
implement the Adam Walsh Act in Ohio will be offset by the funds received
through its application.7
The Adam Walsh Act is aimed at protecting children, preventing
child abuse, and honoring the memory of Adam Walsh and other child
However, there is little evidence that the sex offender
victims.8
classification and registration requirements have any significant effect on
lowering the number of sex offenses committed on children.9 Arguably,
these continuously increasing registration requirements are shifting from the
intended remedial purpose of protecting society to a purely punitive measure
of punishing and embarrassing sex offenders in violation of their
constitutional rights.
This Comment examines the constitutionality of the current Ohio
sex offender registration laws, as amended by S.B. 10, under the United
States and Ohio Constitutions. Specifically, this Comment is focused on the
whether the new registration laws constitute violations of the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the United States Constitution or the retroactivity clause of the
Ohio Constitution.
In order to properly analyze the above listed issues, it is important to
understand how sex offender legislation has developed both at the federal
level and within Ohio. Thus, Section II of this comment explains past
legislation regarding sex offender supervision and further explains the
developments in the sex offender registration and classification
requirements. Section III examines the constitutional implications of the
enactment of S.B. 10, which retroactively applies additional burdens on sex
offenders for past conduct for which they have already been convicted and
punished. This brings up constitutional issues such as laws against Ex Post
Facto and laws of retroactivity.

6

The Adam Walsh Act is the latest sex offender registration law to retroactively increase
registration requirements imposed on sex offenders at sentencing. While arguably the registration
requirements can be seen as “punishment,” presently the United States Supreme Court and the Ohio
Supreme Court have declined to reach that conclusion. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003);
State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ohio 1998); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368-69
(1997). Accordingly, given the history and development of Ohio’s sex offender registration laws over
the last decade, it seems the Ohio General Assembly is determined to continually increase the registration
requirements (or punishment) imposed on sex offenders by merely referring to this dramatic increase as
remedial in nature, thereby avoiding any violation of the United States or Ohio Constitutions.
7
Margo Pierce, Next Comes Burning at the Stake: Is Ohio Getting Too Tough on Sex Offenders?,
CITYBEAT, Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.citybeat.com/cincinnati/article-3033-cover-story-next-comesburning-at-the-stake.html.
8
Adam Walsh Act § 102.
9
Pierce, supra note 7.
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II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL AND STATE
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS
A. Initial Development of Sex Offender Registration Laws
In 1944, California passed the first sex offender registration statute
of any kind, which required a compilation of the names of felony offenders
for the purpose of information sharing among law enforcement agencies.10
By 1986, five states had taken offender registration laws one step further by
focusing their requirements on sex offenders.11 These early sex offender
registration statutes limited the dissemination of registration information
only to law enforcement agencies.12 However, “several high-profile childrape and murder cases in the early 1990s” set in motion a new wave of sex
offender registration statutes, and by 1994, thirty-nine states had passed sex
offender registration laws.13
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the state of Washington suffered
several heinous and disturbing events involving the rape and murder of
children. In 1989, Westley Dodd abducted, raped, and murdered two young
brothers.14 While still at large, Dodd molested and murdered another young
boy only a month later.15 After his capture, Dodd claimed that “if released
he would rape and kill again and enjoy it . . . .”16 Later in 1990, Earl
Shriner, a repeat sex offender, raped a boy and left him for dead after he
stabbed the boy and cut off his penis.17
These gruesome events dominated the Washington media in the
early 1990s, leading to a frightened and outraged public.18 Subsequently,
Washington passed the first sex offender registration statute, which allowed
the release of sex offender information to the public “when ‘relevant . . .
[and] necessary . . . to protect the public.’”19 Washington allowed
community notification through means such as posting bulletin board
notices or putting flyers in mailboxes.20
Also in 1989, an eleven-year-old boy, named Jacob Wetterling, was
abducted in Minnesota.21 Authorities believed his abduction was related to a
10

Steven J. Costigliacci, Note, Protecting Our Children from Sex Offenders: Have We Gone Too
Far?, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 180, 182 (2008).
11
Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex-Offender
Registration and Community-Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163, 164 (2003).
12
Id.
13
Id. at 164-65.
14
Id. at 165.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Garfinkle, supra note 11, at 165.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Costigliacci, supra note 10, at 182.
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particular group of sex offenders who were recently released and living in
the area.22 However, at the time, law enforcement officials did not have any
information on the identity or locality of sex offenders.23 Accordingly,
Minnesota passed legislation requiring sex offenders to register on a central
list available to all law enforcement agencies.24 The impact of these high
profile sex offenses committed against children coupled with the increased
number of states passing sex offender registration laws led to the first
federal act requiring states to create sex offender registries.
B. The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act
The tragedy of Jacob Wetterling’s abduction inspired the creation of
the first federal statute requiring all fifty states to create sex offender
registries or face a reduction in federal funding.25 The Act was named after
Jacob and came to be known as the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (“Jacob Wetterling
Act”).26 Passed by Congress in 1994, the Jacob Wetterling Act mandated
that all states enact laws requiring offenders convicted of offenses “against a
minor or a sexually violent offense to register a current address with state or
local authorities.”27 Further, the Jacob Wetterling Act allowed the Office of
the Attorney General to issue guidelines stating that any state that failed to
comply with the Act within the required time period would lose ten percent
in federal funding.28 Under the Jacob Wetterling Act, the length of
registration was determined by the “previous number of convictions, the
nature of the offense, and the characterization of the offender as a sexual
predator.”29 Further, local law enforcement agencies were not required to
notify the community, but rather, law enforcement agencies were given the
discretion to notify or to not notify communities of sex offenders recently
released and living in the area.30
C. Megan’s Law
In 1994, another high profile crime involving the rape and murder
of a child influenced legislatures to increase the provisions of sex offender
registration laws. On July 29, 1994, a seven-year-old girl, named Megan
22

Id.
Id. at 182-83.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 183.
26
Id. at 182-83.
27
Alicia A. Sterrett, Note, The Case for Kentucky Sex Offenders: Residency Restrictions and Their
Constitutional Validity, 96 KY. L.J. 119, 120 (2007-08).
28
Id. at 120-21.
29
Id. at 120.
30
Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions: Are There Any Limits?, 34 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17, 30 (2008).
23
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Kanka, was enticed into the home of a neighbor who promised Megan that
there was a puppy inside for her to play with.31 The neighbor, Jesse
Timmendequas, was a twice convicted sex offender against children, and he
raped and murdered Megan just thirty yards from her own home.32 Megan’s
mother and thousands of supporters begged the New Jersey legislature to
help communities identify and locate the sex offenders residing amongst
them.33 Megan’s mother claimed “her daughter would still be alive if she
had known about her neighbor’s history of sexual offenses . . . .”34
Therefore, the New Jersey legislature passed “the first piece of legislation
bearing the name ‘Megan’s Law.’”35
This tragedy, as well as others, alerted Congress that some law
enforcement agencies were not exercising their discretion to notify
communities of sex offenders living in the area, leading to inconsistent
community notification standards. In response, Congress amended the
Jacob Wetterling Act in 1996, which abolished law enforcement discretion
and imposed an affirmative duty on law enforcement agencies to release sex
offender registration information.36 Further, Congress amended the Jacob
Wetterling Act to allow registration information to be distributed for any
purpose permitted by state law. The amended Jacob Wetterling Act was
renamed Megan’s Law, which was the federal version of Megan’s Law
enacted by New Jersey.37 Under the newly enacted federal Megan’s Law,
all fifty states were obligated to operate under a common standard of
community notification.38 Later in 1996, Congress passed the Pam Lychner
Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, which created a
federal database for sex offender registration information, further adding to
the nationwide conformity of sex offender legislation.39
D. The Adam Walsh Act
The Adam Walsh Act is the latest development in federal sex
offender registration laws, and it has raised the bar on sex offender
registration laws throughout the country. On July 27, 2006, the Adam
Walsh Act was signed into law and has greatly increased “the scope, scale,
and requirements of sex offender registration programs.”40 The Adam
Walsh Act is the culmination of ever-increasing registration requirements
influenced by several highly publicized crimes against children, as shown in
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
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Garfinkle, supra note 11, at 165; Sterrett, supra note 27, at 121.
Garfinkle, supra note 11, at 166; Sterrett, supra note 27, at 121.
Garfinkle, supra note 11, at 166.
Id.
Id.
Sterrett, supra note 27, at 121.
Garfinkle, supra note 11, at 166-67.
Id. at 167.
Id.
Wright, supra note 30, at 31.
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section 102 of the Act.41
Nearly a decade after Megan’s Law required law enforcement
agencies to notify communities of sex offender registration, the Adam
Walsh Act requires those law enforcement agencies to “make sex offenders’
information accessible to anyone with the click of a button.”42 Section 118
of the Adam Walsh Act states:
Except as provided in this section, each jurisdiction shall
make available on the Internet, in a manner that is readily
accessible to all jurisdictions and to the public, all
information about each sex offender in the registry. The
jurisdiction shall maintain the Internet site in a manner that
will permit the public to obtain relevant information for
each sex offender by a single query for any given zip code
or geographic radius set by the user. The jurisdiction shall
also include in the design of its Internet site all field search
capabilities needed for full participation in the Dru Sjodin
National Sex Offender Public Website and shall participate
in that website as provided by the Attorney General.43
The Adam Walsh Act requires the U.S. Attorney General to
“maintain a national database at the Federal Bureau of Investigation for each
sex offender and any other person required to register in a jurisdiction’s sex
offender registry,” and to ensure (through the National Sex Offender
Registry or otherwise) that updated information about a sex offender is
immediately transmitted by electronic forwarding to all relevant
jurisdictions.44 The Attorney General must also maintain a website that
include[s] relevant information for each sex offender and
other person listed on a jurisdiction’s Internet site. The
Website shall allow the public to obtain relevant
41

Adam Walsh Act § 102.
In order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children,
and in response to the vicious attacks by violent predators against the victims listed
below, Congress in this Act establishes a comprehensive national system for the
registration of those offenders: (1) Jacob Wetterling, who was 11 years old, was
abducted in 1989 in Minnesota, and remains missing. (2) Megan Nicole Kanka,
who was 7 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 1994, in
New Jersey. (3) Pam Lychner, who was 31 years old, was attacked by a career
offender in Houston, Texas. (4) Jetseta Gage, who was 10 years old, was
kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 2005, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. (5)
Dru Sjodin, who was 22 years old, was sexually assaulted and murdered in 2003,
in North Dakota.

Id.

42
43
44

Wright, supra note 30, at 30.
Adam Walsh Act § 118.
Id. § 119.
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information for each sex offender by a single query for any
given zip code or geographical radius set by the user in a
form and with such limitations as may be established by the
Attorney General and shall have such other field search
capabilities as the Attorney General may provide.45
Further, the Adam Walsh Act groups sex offenders into three
categories or tiers based solely on the sex offense committed.46 The Adam
Walsh Act defines a “sex offender” as “an individual who was convicted of
a sex offense.”47 A Tier I sex offender is a sex offender other than a Tier II
or Tier III sex offender.48 A Tier II sex offender is a sex offender that has
committed an offense that is punishable by more than one year in prison and
fits within a list of offenses (which are less severe than Tier III offenses) or
committed an offense after becoming a Tier I offender.49 A Tier III sex
offender is a sex offender that has committed an offense that is punishable
by more than one year in prison and is a serious offense, such as aggravated
sexual abuse, or committed a sex offense while becoming a Tier II sex
offender.50 Under the Adam Walsh Act, the registration requirements of the
three tiers of sex offenders are as follows:
(1) Tier I offenders are required to register in person once a
year for fifteen years;51
(2) Tier II offenders are required to register in person every
six months for twenty-five years;52
(3) Tier III offenders are required to register in person every
three months for life.53
The Adam Walsh Act not only increases “the scope, scale, and
requirements of sex offender registration programs,” but it also allows for
retroactive application. Before releasing or after sentencing a sex offender,
the Adam Walsh Act requires that an appropriate official inform the sex
offender of his duty to register, explain those duties, have the sex offender
45

Id. § 120(b).
Id. § 111.
Id. § 111(1).
48
Adam Walsh Act § 111(2); 42 U.S.C. § 16911(2).
49
Id. § 111(3)(A)-(B) (offenses include: “(i) sex trafficking (as described in section 1591 of title 18,
United States Code); (ii) coercion and enticement (as described in section 2422(b) of title 18, United
States Code); (iii) transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity (as described in section
2423(a)) of title 18, United States Code; (iv) abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title
18, United States Code); (B) involves—(i) use of a minor in a sexual performance; (ii) solicitation of a
minor to practice prostitution; or (iii) production or distribution of child pornography . . . .”).
50
Id. § 111(4)(A)(i)–(ii) (offenses include: “(i) aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as
described in sections 2241 and 2242 of title 18, United States Code); or (ii) abusive sexual contact (as
described in section 2244 of title 18, United States Code) against a minor who has not attained the age of
13 years . . . .”).
51
Id. §§ 115-16.
52
Id.
53
Id.
46
47
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acknowledge that those duties have been explained to him by signing a
form, and ensure that the sex offender is registered.54 However, the Adam
Walsh Act further states “[t]he Attorney General shall prescribe rules for the
notification of sex offenders who cannot be registered in accordance with
subsection (a).”55 This means that every sex offender who was previously
convicted of a sex offense and who is in custody, will have to comply with
section 117(a) of the Adam Walsh Act before release. Furthermore, every
sex offender who was previously convicted of a sex offense and who is no
longer in custody will be subject to the rule prescribed by the Attorney
General.
In compliance with section 117(a) of the Adam Walsh Act, the
Attorney General issued a rule on February 28, 2007, which states “[t]he
requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act apply to
all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which
registration is required prior to the enactment of that Act.”56 This rule
requires retroactive application of the Adam Walsh Act to all sex offenders
already convicted and classified under Megan’s Law. This increases the
registration requirements57 and raises issues as to the constitutionality of
the Adam Walsh Act.
E. Ohio Sex Offender Registration Laws Under House Bill 180
Ohio has mandated sex offender registration since 1963.58 In 1996,
the Ohio General Assembly rewrote chapter 2950 of the Ohio Revised Code
(“R.C.”) to comply with Megan’s Law.59 Ohio’s version of Megan’s Law
came in the form of House Bill 180 (“H.B. 180”), and was enacted into law
in July 1996 before going into effect on January 1, 1997.60
Under R.C. chapter 2950, as amended by H.B. 180, sex offenders
were classified into one of three categories: (1) sexually oriented offenders;
(2) habitual sexual offenders; or (3) sexual predators.61 All offenders were
required to register with the county sheriff and to provide the county sheriff,
at the minimum, a current home address, a current business address, and a
current photograph.62 The frequency of the required registration was
determined by the sex offender’s classification:
54

Adam Walsh Act § 117(a).
Id. § 117(b).
28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2007); see also United States v. Waybright, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1159-60 (D.
Mont. 2008).
57
Failure of a sex offender to comply with the new registration requirements is a federal offense,
which can result in a fine or imprisonment of not more than ten years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006).
58
Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 574.
59
H.B. 180, 121st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1996); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2950 (West
2006 & Supp. 2009); see also Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 574.
60
Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 574.
61
See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2950.01 (2006).
62
Id. § 2950.04(A), (C).
55
56
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(1) Sexually oriented offenders were required to register
once a year for ten years;
(2) Habitual sexual offenders were required to register once
a year for twenty years;
(3) Sexual predators were required to register every ninety
days for life.63
In determining whether an offender was a sexual predator, courts
were to consider the following factors: (1) the offender’s age; (2) any prior
criminal record; (3) the age of the victim; (4) the number of victims; (5)
whether drugs or alcohol were used to impair the victim; (6) whether any
prior convictions or pleas led to any available programs for sex offenders;
(7) mental illness or mental disability; (8) the nature of the conduct with the
victim and evidence of a pattern of abuse; (9) whether the offender acted
with cruelty or threatened cruelty; (10) any additional behavior that
contributed to the conduct.64 Also, sexual predators could request a hearing
in which the court would review the threat the offender posed to the
community.65 If the court found that the offender was no longer a threat, the
court could revoke the sexual predator classification.66
Under R.C. chapter 2950, as amended by H.B. 180, the community
notification provisions applied equally to all sexual offenders.67 The sheriff
of each jurisdiction was required to notify all community members of a sex
offender’s registration, including: (1) adjacent neighbors; (2) local law
enforcement agencies; and (3) officials responsible for the safety of children
and other potential victims.68
F. Ohio Sex Offender Registration Laws Under Senate Bill 5
The Ohio General Assembly again amended R.C. chapter 2950
through Senate Bill 5 (“S.B. 5”), which was enacted in 2003.69 Under S.B.
5, the ability of a sexual predator to receive a hearing to determine his
current threat to the community was abolished.70 Also, sexually oriented
offenders were barred from residing within one thousand feet of a school,
and landlords and municipalities were granted the right to seek injunctive
relief against offenders residing within one thousand feet of a school.71
Finally, S.B. 5 expanded the amount of personal information included on the
63

Id. §§ 2950.07(B)(1), 2950.06(B)(1), 2950.04(C)(2).
Id. § 2950.09(B)(3)(a)-(j).
65
Id. § 2950.07(B)(1).
66
Id.
67
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.11(A).
68
Id.
69
S.B. 5, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003), available at http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/
analyses125/s0005-ps-125.pdf.
70
Id.
71
Id.
64
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sex offender database, and required sex offenders to register in the county of
their employment, their school, and their residence.72
G. Ohio Sex Offender Registration Laws Under Senate Bill 10
The Ohio General Assembly brought Ohio sex offender registration
laws into compliance with the Adam Walsh Act with the passing of Senate
Bill 10 (“S.B. 10”).73 S.B. 10 amended R.C. chapter 2950 in five ways: (1)
re-classified sex offenders into tiers based on offense; (2) increased
frequency and prolonged duration of registration requirements; (3)
heightened notification requirements; (4) expanded residency restrictions;
and (5) increased penalties for non-compliance.74
S.B. 10, like the Adam Walsh Act, classifies sex offenders using a
three-tier system. Tier I sex offenders are persons who pleaded guilty to, are
convicted of, or conspired to commit any of the following crimes:
(1) Sexual imposition;
(2) Importuning;
(3) Voyeurism;
(4) Pandering obscenity;
(5) Unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, when the
offender is less than four years older than the other person,
where the person did not consent and the offender has not
been convicted of or plead guilty to a violation of R.C.
sections 2907.02, 2907.03;
(6) Gross sexual imposition;
(7) Illegal use of a minor in nudity oriented material or
performance; and
(8) Menacing by stalking with sexual motivation, or
enticement with sexual motivation.75
Tier II offenders are persons who pleaded guilty to, are convicted
of, or conspired to commit any of the following crimes:
(1) Compelling prostitution, pandering obscenity involving
a minor, or pandering sexually oriented material involving a
72

Id.
See generally S.B. 10, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2008). Prior to the enactment of S.B.
10, Ohio sex offender registration laws were modeled after Megan's Law. Id. The Ohio General
Assembly quickly passed S.B. 10 to model Ohio sex offender registration laws after the Adam Walsh
Act, and thereby avoided the penalty of a ten percent reduction in federal law enforcement funding as set
forth in the Adam Walsh Act. Adam Walsh Act § 125.
74
See S.B. 10, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2008).
75
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 2950.01(E) (Supp. 2009).
73
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minor;
(2) Unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, where the
offender is at least four years older than the victim but has
not been previously convicted of or plead guilty to a
violation of R.C. sections 2907.02, 2907.03, 2907.04;
(3) Gross sexual imposition where the victim is under the
age of thirteen, or illegal use of a minor in nudity oriented
material or performance;
(4) Kidnapping with sexual motivation;
(5) Kidnapping when the victim is eighteen or older; and
(6) Abduction with sexual motivation.76
Tier III offenders are persons who pleaded guilty to, are convicted
of, or conspired to commit any of the following crimes:
(1) Rape or sexual battery;
(2) Gross sexual imposition;
(3)Aggravated murder pursuant to R.C. section 2903.01,
murder pursuant to R.C. section 2903.02, or felonious
assault pursuant to R.C. section 2903.11, when committed
with a sexual motivation;
(4) Unlawful death or termination of pregnancy as a result
of committing or attempting to commit a felony pursuant to
R.C. section 2903.04(A), when the offender committed or
attempted to commit the felony that is the basis of the
violation with a sexual motivation;
(5) Kidnapping pursuant to R.C. section 2905.01(A)(4),
when the victim is under the age of eighteen; and
(6) Kidnapping of a minor pursuant to R.C. section
2905.01(B), where the victim is under the age of eighteen
and the offender is not the parent of the victim.77
Under S.B. 10, the duration and frequency of the registration of sex
offenders is determined by the tier and is as follows: (1) Tier I sex offenders
must register every year for fifteen years; (2) Tier II offenders must register
every 180 days for twenty-five years; (3) Tier III offenders must register
every ninety days for life.78 Further, regardless of classification, the sheriff
with whom the offender registers is required to notify all those living within
76
77
78
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one thousand feet of the offender’s residence.79 That notification includes
the offender’s: (1) name; (2) address; (3) offense and conviction; (4)
classification; and (5) photograph.80 This notification is also provided to
schools, day care facilities, law enforcement agencies, and other groups who
have contact with minors within a specified geographic region.81
Residency restrictions, regardless of classification, include
provisions prohibiting sex offenders from residing within one thousand feet
of a school or day care facility.82 In addition, landlords are permitted to
terminate rental agreements and seek injunctive relief in an effort to oust the
offender from the residence.83 Failure to comply with the registration
requirements is a felony under S.B. 10. Further, the Ohio Attorney General
has the discretion to retroactively apply the heightened registration
requirements of S.B. 10 to persons convicted of sex offenses prior to the
enactment of S.B. 10.84
III. ANALYSIS
One of the most significant differences between R.C. chapter 2950,
as amended by H.B. 180, and R.C. chapter 2950, as amended by S.B. 10, is
that the H.B. 180 amendments allowed judges to use discretion when
determining a sex offender’s classification.85 Therefore, under the H.B. 180
amendments, judges were able to determine the sex offender’s risk of
recidivism, and then apply the appropriate sex offender registration
requirements necessary to protect the community from the sex offender.
The enactment of S.B. 10 erased this discretion and now requires all current
sex offenders to be classified or re-classified under one of the three tiers,
which are based solely on the offense committed.
The problem that arises is that many sex offenders who were at one
time deemed by judges to be low risk offenders are now required to be reclassified as Tier III offenders. In many cases, this dramatically increases
the frequency of registration requirements from once a year for ten years to
every ninety days for life. While this negatively affects all sex offenders, it
especially affects juvenile offenders because they were not previously given
such strict registration requirements under the adjudicating judge’s
discretion.86 Generally, the sentencing of juveniles is aimed at rehabilitation
79

Id. § 2950.11(A).
See id. § 2950.11(B)(1)-(5).
81
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.11(A) (Supp. 2009).
82
Id. § 2950.034(A).
83
See id. § 2950.034(B); State v. Omiecinski, No. 90510, 2009 WL 626114, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App.
March 12, 2009).
84
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(A)(1) (Supp. 2009).
85
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.021 (2006).
86
See Jennifer M. O'Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Getting Smart About Getting Tough: Juvenile
Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1299, 1310 (1996) (“Although
juvenile courts are at least as ‘tough’ on juveniles as criminal courts are on adults in the areas of formal
80
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rather than punishment.87 Undoubtedly, the dramatic increase in the
frequency of the sex offender registration requirements has and will
continue to create a wave of litigation challenging the constitutionality of
such a law.
While the constitutionality of S.B 10 can be challenged in a number
of different ways, this comment seeks to focus on two similar but distinct
constitutional challenges. First, this comment analyzes whether S.B. 10 is
constitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution.
Second, this comment analyzes whether S.B. 10 is
constitutional under the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution. Also,
this comment uses the Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis in State v. Cook as a
basis for analyzing the above listed constitutional challenges.88 In Cook, the
constitutionality of R.C. chapter 2950, as amended by H.B. 180, was
challenged under both the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution and the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution.89 The
Ohio Supreme Court upheld H.B. 180 as constitutional under both
challenges.90 When challenges to S.B. 10 reach the Ohio Supreme Court,
Cook will likely act as the guiding precedent in determining the
constitutionality of S.B. 10 under the Ex Post Facto and the retroactivity
clauses.
A. The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution states
“[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.”91 According to
Black’s Law Dictionary, ex post facto is defined as “[d]one or made after
the fact.”92 The Ex Post Facto Clause serves the important purpose of
ensuring that legislative acts “give fair warning of their effect and permit
individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.”93 Further, the
Ex Post Facto Clause prevents the legislature from abusing its authority by
processing and convictions, they are less ‘tough’ in sentencing. In state criminal court, 52% of those
arrested for murder, 47% of those arrested for rape, and 10% of those arrested for aggravated assault are
ultimately incarcerated for these crimes. For those sentenced in juvenile court, however, only 33% of
juveniles arrested for murder, 18% of juveniles arrested for rape, and 14% of juveniles arrested for
aggravated assault are ultimately placed in secure confinement.”).
87
Kristin L. Caballero, Note, Blended Sentencing: A Good Idea for Juvenile Sex Offenders, 19 ST.
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 379, 384-85 (2005) (“The creation of juvenile courts was part of the
Progressive Era reform. The emerging view was that juvenile criminals were different from adult
criminals and should thus be treated differently. The juvenile court system was created to be a venue
specially designed to deal with children’s special needs and to provide treatment and rehabilitation to
juveniles. The underlying premise was the belief that children are malleable and are capable of being
reformed. Under the concept of ‘parens patriae,’ the state was deemed to play the role of the parent. As
a ‘parent,’ the state assumed the power and authority to help rehabilitate the child offender.”).
88
Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 570.
89
Id. at 573.
90
Id. at 588.
91
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
92
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
93
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981).
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“enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislation” aimed at disfavored groups.94
The Ex Post Facto Clause only applies to criminal statutes;
however, the United States Supreme Court has declined to set out a specific
test for determining whether a statute is criminal or civil for the purposes of
applying the Ex Post Facto Clause.95 In the past, the Supreme Court has
used the “intent-effects” test to delineate between civil and criminal statutes
for the purposes of Ex Post Facto analysis.96 The Ohio Supreme Court also
used the “intent-effects” test in State v. Cook when it considered the
constitutionality of H.B. 180 under the Ex Post Facto Clause:97
In applying the intent-effects test, [the] court must first
determine whether the General Assembly, “in establishing
the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or
impliedly a preference for one label of the other” and
second, where the General Assembly “has indicated an
intention to establish a civil penalty, . . . whether the
statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect
as to negate that intention.”98
This basically means that if a statute is intended to be criminal and
is applied retroactively, then it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; but if the
statute is intended to be civil and is applied retroactively, then it will only
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if the civil statue is so punitive in effect
that it negates the legislative intent.
1. The Ohio General Assembly’s Intent
The first step in determining the intent of the legislature is to look at
the language and purpose of the statute.99 In Cook, the Ohio Supreme Court
looked at the language of R.C. section 2950.02 and found the intent of the
General Assembly in passing H.B. 180 to be civil in nature.100 R.C. section
2950.02(A) states:
The general assembly hereby determines and declares that it
recognizes and finds all of the following:
(1) If the public is provided adequate notice and information
about offenders and delinquent children who commit
sexually oriented offenses or who commit child-victim
oriented offenses, members of the public and communities
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987).
California Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504, 508-09 (1995).
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353-69.
Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 580.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 581.
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can develop constructive plans to prepare themselves and
their children for the offender’s or delinquent child’s release
from imprisonment, a prison term, or other confinement or
detention.
This allows members of the public and
communities to meet with members of law enforcement
agencies to prepare and obtain information about the rights
and responsibilities of the public and the communities and
to provide education and counseling to their children.
(2) Sex offenders and child-victim offenders pose a risk of
engaging in further sexually abusive behavior even after
being released from imprisonment, a prison term, or other
confinement or detention, and protection of members of the
public from sex offenders and child-victim offenders is a
paramount governmental interest. . . .
(6) The release of information about sex offenders and
child-victim offenders to public agencies and the general
public will further the governmental interests of public
safety and public scrutiny of the criminal, juvenile, and
mental health systems as long as the information released is
rationally related to the furtherance of those goals.101
R.C. section 2950.02(B) further states:
it is the policy of this state to require the exchange in
accordance with this chapter of relevant information about
sex offenders and child-victim offenders among public
agencies and officials and to authorize the release in
accordance with this chapter of necessary and relevant
information about sex offenders and child-victim offenders
to members of the general public as a means of assuring
public protection and that the exchange or release of that
information is not punitive.102
This language existed as a part of R.C. chapter 2950 after it was
amended by H.B. 180 and was not substantially changed by the S.B. 10
amendments.103
In Cook, the Ohio Supreme Court found that this language showed
the General Assembly’s intent to create a civil statute.104 “This language
reveals that the General Assembly’s purpose behind R.C. chapter 2950 was
to promote public safety and to bolster the public’s confidence in Ohio’s
101
102
103

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.02(A)(1)-(2), (6) (Supp. 2009).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.02(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.02 (2006) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.02 (Supp.

2009).
104
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criminal and mental health systems. The statute is absolutely devoid of any
language indicating the intent to punish.”105 Because the language of R.C.
section 2950.02, as amended by S.B. 10, is substantially similar to the
language the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed in Cook, the intent of S.B 10
will most likely be found to be civil and non-punitive in nature. It will be
difficult for challengers to argue that this language shows the intent to create
a criminal statute; thereby the success of such a challenge must rest solely
on proving that the effect of S.B. 10 is so punitive it negates legislative
intent.
However, sex offenders can argue that the General Assembly
showed the intent to create a criminal statute when they placed the sex
offender registration requirements squarely within Title 29 of the Ohio
Revised Code, which deals exclusively with crime and procedure. The
strong language of R.C. section 2950.02 would likely cause the Ohio
Supreme Court to further analyze the effects of S.B. 10.
2. Effects of S.B. 10
Whether a retroactive statute is so punitive as to violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause is a “matter of degree.”106 While there is no absolute test for
determining whether a statute is punitive, the Supreme Court has created
several guideposts. The guideposts include: (1) “[w]hether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence”; (4)
whether the statute has a connection to a non-punitive purpose; and (5)
“whether it appears excessive in relation to [that] alternative
purpose . . . .”107
a. First Guidepost: Disability or Restraint
In Cook, the Ohio Supreme Court found that R.C. chapter 2950, as
amended by H.B. 180, did not involve an affirmative disability or restraint
because the dissemination of the information was not a burden placed on the
sex offender and the registration requirements were de minimis
administrative requirements.108 The Ohio Supreme Court compared the sex
offender registry inconvenience to that of the inconvenience of renewing a
driver’s license.109 However, under the amendments of S.B. 10, sex
offenders may have a stronger argument for a finding of disability or
restraint.
105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Morales, 514 U.S. at 509.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 582.
Id.
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Under S.B. 10, every time a sex offender registers with the county
sheriff he or she must provide the following information: (1) name; (2)
social security number; (3) address of current residence or an address where
the individual will reside; (4) name and address of any place the sex
offender is employed or will be employed; (5) name and address of any
school to which the individual is a student or will be a student; (6) license
plate number and description of any vehicle owned or operated by the sex
offender; (7) DNA sample; and (8) any other information required by the
Ohio Attorney General.110 Further, in Ohio a driver’s license is renewed
once every several years, while newly re-classified Tier III sex offenders
have to provide this information every ninety days for the rest of their lives.
Further, if any of the above information is subject to change, the sex
offender must provide the sheriff with a written notice twenty days before
the change is to occur.111 Additionally, the failure to renew a driver’s
license results in the loss of a privilege, while failure to comply with sex
offender registration requirements results in criminal penalties.112
Also, as discussed above, R.C. chapter 2950 places residency
restrictions on sex offenders by dictating where they can and cannot
reside.113 This creates a restraint on liberty that should be considered to
operate as a disability on all sex offenders. Retroactively extending the
registration period for sex offenders classified under the amendments of
H.B. 180 extends the disability imposed on sex offenders and strengthens
the argument that the registration has a punitive effect.
b. Second Guidepost: Historically Regarded as Punishment
The Ohio Supreme Court also reasoned in Cook that the sex
offender notification and registration requirements have long been
recognized as a valid regulatory technique with a remedial purpose.114 The
Ohio Supreme Court held that “[t]he purpose . . . to protect the public, must
prevail over any ancillary, detrimental effect that the limited dissemination
of the registered information may have on a sex offender.”115 The
information available to the public, which the sex offender is to report at
each registration, includes the information listed above (with the exception
of their social security number), as well as all of the following information:
(1) physical description of the offender; (2) text defining the offense for
which the offender is registered; (3) criminal history; (4) current photograph
of offender; (5) finger and palm prints; (6) photocopy of driver’s license or
identification card; and (7) other information required by the Attorney
110
111
112
113
114
115
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General.116
It can be argued that the requirements of S.B. 10 go beyond mere
official criminal records open to the public; instead, S.B. 10 sets up a system
that effectively ostracizes sex offenders and subjects them to potential
abuse. The following story is an example of such abuse towards sex
offenders. In April of 2006, Stephen Marshall looked up sex offenders on
Maine’s sex offender website.117 After finding dozens of names, he drove to
two sex offenders’ homes and shot and killed both of them.118 One of
Marshall’s victims was required to register as a sex offender because he was
convicted of statutory rape when, as a nineteen-year-old, he had sex with his
fifteen-year-old girlfriend. The broad sex offender registration and
notification requirements can lead to vigilantism, which is counter to public
safety.
Further, our society’s ridicule and abuse of sex offenders should be
recognized as punishment. As stated by Justice Lanzinger, “I do not believe
we can continue to label these proceedings as civil in nature . . . . [they]
should be recognized as part of the punishment . . . .”119 Retroactively
extending the time a sex offender is subject to this type of ridicule and abuse
should strengthen the argument that the scheme is punitive in effect.
c. Third Guidepost: Traditional Aims of Punishment
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that retribution is vengeance for
its own sake, and that it does not seek to affect future conduct.120 Deterrent
measures are negative repercussions to discourage people from engaging in
certain behavior, and remedial measures seek to solve a problem by
removing the likely perpetrators of future corruption.121 In Cook, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that R.C. chapter 2950, as amended by H.B. 180, did
not seek vengeance for its own sake and did not act as a deterrent.122 The
Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that because sex offenders are not deterred by
the threat of incarceration the registration requirements would have little and
likely no detrimental effect at all.123 Also, deterrence alone is insufficient to
find a punitive effect.124
S.B. 10 is different from H.B. 180 in that S.B. 10 takes away all
discretion from judges and classifies sex offenders solely on the offense
116

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.081 (2006).
Wright, supra note 30, at 31.
118
Id.
119
State v. Wilson, 865 N.E.2d 1264, 1273 (Ohio 2007) (Lanzinger, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
120
Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 583.
121
Id.
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Id.
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committed. By connecting the registration requirements to a specific
offense, potential offenders are put on notice of the consequences of any
violation, thereby having at least the possibility of creating a deterrent
effect. The “lack of any case-by-case determination demonstrates that the
restriction is ‘vengeance for its own sake.’”125 The amendments of S.B. 10
fail to consider the likelihood that the sex offender will re-offend and further
imposes even more stringent registration requirements. Retroactively
applying more stringent registration requirements to sex offenders deemed
by judges to be unlikely to recidivate should be viewed as furthering the
traditional aims of punishment or seen as vengeance for its own sake.
d. Fourth Guidepost: Connection to Non-Punitive Purpose
In Cook, the Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. chapter 2950
serves the purpose of protecting the general public from released sex
offenders and that the protection of the public is a paramount governmental
police power.126 The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that released sex
offenders have a high rate of recidivism, which demands that the
government take action to protect against such offenses.127 The sex offender
registration requirements allow local law enforcement agencies to maintain
the necessary information needed to monitor sex offenders, thereby
lowering recidivism.128
The S.B. 10 amendments are not as connected to a non-punitive
purpose as the H.B. 180 amendments because S.B. 10 requires classification
of sex offenders based solely on the offense committed. The S.B. 10
amendments fail to consider the likelihood that a sex offender will reoffend, and in some instances, place life-time registration requirements on
offenders who may never re-offend. Further, not all sex offenders have a
high rate of recidivism. For example, juvenile sex offenders have
recidivism rates that range between seven to thirteen percent, while the
recidivism rates of juvenile non-sexual offenders range between twenty-five
and fifty percent.129 On average, sex offender recidivism rates are found to
be around thirteen percent, which happens to be a lower recidivism rate than
any other category of offenders besides murderers.130
Laws such as the Adam Walsh Act are designed to provide
protection from sex offenses committed by strangers. However, only three
percent of sexual abuse and six percent of child murders are committed by
125

Mikaloff v. Walsh, No. 5:06-CV-96, 2007 WL 2572268, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2007).
Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 581.
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Id. at 584.
128
Id.
129
TIM BYNUM, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS (2001), http://
www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.html.
130
Garfinkle, supra note 11, at 172.
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strangers.131 The non-punitive purpose is weakened by the reality that the
high profile cases committed by strangers, for which S.B. 10 was created to
protect against, are already rare occurrences.
While the S.B. 10
amendments may provide a select few with some protection, it definitely
extends, without discretion, more restrictive registration requirements on
high and low risk sex offenders, and this extension should strengthen the
argument for a punitive effect.
e. Fifth Guidepost: Excessive in Relation to the Alternative Purpose
In Cook, the Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. chapter 2950, as
amended by H.B. 180, was “narrowly tailored to comport with the
respective danger and recidivism levels of the different classifications . . .
.”132 Also, sex offenders could request a hearing and submit evidence under
R.C. section 2950.09(D)(1) to show that they no longer fit a certain label.133
The dissemination of the information was also restricted to those likely to
have contact with the sex offender, such as neighbors.134 The holding by the
United States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks also influenced the
Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Cook.135 In Hendricks, the Kansas passed
a law that allowed a sex offender to be involuntarily detained for treatment
purposes, even after he served his prison term.136 The United States
Supreme Court upheld the law as constitutional, precluding any finding that
the law was in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.137 The Ohio Supreme
Court reasoned that the involuntary commitment of Hendricks was far more
restrictive than the registration and notification requirements of R.C. chapter
2950, and therefore held that the H.B. 180 amendments were nonpunitive.138
R.C. chapter 2950, as amended by S.B. 10, can no longer be viewed
as narrowly tailored to a non-punitive purpose. S.B. 10 is not narrowly
tailored because it imposes more stringent restrictions and obligations
without any regard for the sex offender’s potential future harm. Further,
under the S.B. 10 amendments, the sex offender does not have the same
opportunities for a hearing. For example, R.C. section 2950.09 has been
repealed under the S.B. 10 amendments.139 There is no longer a need for a
hearing because the sex offender cannot offer any evidence to sway the
131

Id. at 173.
Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 584-85.
Id. at 584.
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Id.
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Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351-52.
137
Id. at 373.
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Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 585.
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See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.09 (repealed 2008). “The judge who is to impose sentence on
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judge’s determination. Presently, the classifications are based solely on the
offense committed.
For example, in Doe v. Dann the plaintiffs filed for a preliminary
injunction in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio to enjoin the Attorney General from re-classifying them under the S.B.
10 amendments without a hearing.140 The plaintiffs were all sex offenders
previously classified under the H.B. 180 amendments and, effective January
1, 2008, were subject to re-classification under S.B. 10.141 The plaintiffs
argued “that procedural due process require[d] that they receive a hearing to
challenge their reclassification before they [were] to be subject[ed] to the
heightened obligations and duties imposed by the [amendments of S.B.
10].”142 The Northern District of Ohio held:
plaintiffs “who assert a right to a hearing under the Due
Process Clause must show that the facts they seek to
establish in that hearing are relevant under the statutory
scheme.” As explained above, Ohio’s [S.B. 10] does not
base an offender’s tier classification on any determination
of current dangerousness. Instead, the classification is based
on the fact of his conviction alone. Thus, Connecticut v.
Doe appears to support a finding that plaintiffs are not likely
to succeed in showing they are entitled to a hearing before
being reclassified. 143
The plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied, and
the plaintiffs were likely re-classified without a hearing.144
Also, while the Kansas statute in Hendricks does provide for
involuntary commitment, it does have procedural safeguards built-in to
narrow the scope. The Kansas statute in Hendricks at least provided the sex
offender with a hearing accompanied by the right to present and crossexamine witnesses, the right to assistance of counsel, and the right to
examination by a mental health care professional, all at the state’s expense.
145
The Kansas statute did not involuntarily commit all sex offenders, both
past and present, based solely on their offense.
S.B. 10 provides that the information obtained from the sex offender
registration be stored and maintained on an Internet database, which is
140

Doe v. Dann, No. 1:08 CV 220, 2008 WL 2390778, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June 9, 2008).
Id.
Id. at *6.
143
Id. at *7 (quoting Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (“the United
States Supreme Court has held that public disclosure of a state’s sex offender registry without a hearing
as to whether an offender is ‘currently dangerous’ does not offend due process where the law required an
offender to be registered based on the fact of his conviction alone.”).
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Id. at *12.
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viewable by anyone with Internet access.146 This information is no longer
narrowly disseminated or available only to those the offender may contact.
Now, sex offender registration information is available to every person with
Internet access.147 The above listed circumstances certainly strengthen the
argument that the S.B. 10 amendments are not narrowly tailored to a nonpunitive purpose.
B. The Retroactivity Clause
The Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he general assembly shall
have no power to pass retroactive laws.”148 The Ohio Supreme Court has
held that a retroactive law only violates the Ohio Constitution if it is a
substantive law.149 The Ohio Revised Code states that “[a] statute is
presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made
retrospective.”150 This means that prior to the court determining whether the
statute is substantive, the court must first determine whether the General
Assembly expressly specified that the statute apply retroactively.151
The General Assembly showed the intent to apply the S.B. 10
amendments retroactively under several provisions. First, R.C. section
2950.04(A)(2) states that “[r]egardless of when the sexually oriented offense
was committed, each offender who is convicted of, pleads guilty to, has
been convicted of, or has pleaded guilty to a sexually oriented offense shall
comply with [certain] registration requirements . . . .”152 Second, R.C.
section 2950.11(A) also uses language such as “[r]egardless of when the
sexually oriented offense or child-victim oriented offense was committed”
when describing the community notification information that the sex
offenders are responsible to provide.153 R.C. section 2950.99(A)(1)(b) also
applies penalties to sex offenders whose convictions took place before the
enactment of the S.B. 10 amendments, and makes it a crime to fail to
register under the current amendments.154
Most of this language is substantially similar to the H.B. 180
amendments, and the Ohio Supreme Court in Cook found such language to
clearly express a legislative intent for the statute to apply retroactively.155
The retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution only prohibits retroactive
statutes that are substantive, but allows retroactive remedial statutes: “A
146

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.081(A) (Supp. 2009).
See Ohio’s Electronic Sex Offender Registration and Notification (eSORN), http://www.esorn.ag.
state.oh.us/Secured/p1.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
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OHIO CONST. art. II, § 28.
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Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489, 496 (Ohio 1988).
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See Van Fossen, 522 N.E.2d at 494-96.
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purely remedial statute does not violate Section 28, Article II of the Ohio
Constitution, even if applied retroactively.”156
“A statute is ‘substantive’ if it impairs or takes away vested rights,
affects an accrued substantive right, imposes new or additional burdens,
duties, obligation [sic] or liabilities as to a past transaction, or creates a new
right.”157 “[R]emedial laws are those affecting only the remedy provided,
and include laws that merely substitute a new or more appropriate remedy
for the enforcement of an existing right.”158
In Cook, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the H.B. 180
amendments were remedial in nature and therefore did not violate the
retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution.159 The Ohio Supreme Court
found support for their decision in the fact that much of R.C. chapter 2950 is
directed at public officials rather than sex offenders.160 Also, the Court
reasoned that the new registration requirements would only increase the
frequency and duration of sex offender registration requirements and that
sex offenders had “no reasonable right to expect that their conduct [would]
never thereafter be made the subject of legislation.”161 The Ohio Supreme
Court reasoned that sex offender registration requirements were de minimis
procedural requirements necessary to protect the community.162 The Ohio
Supreme Court recognized that sex offenders would endure emotional
anguish and social stigma, but concluded that such consequences were
social consequences and not a direct result of the new sex offender
registration law.163
The S.B. 10 amendments do more than alter the notification and
verification procedures. The S.B. 10 amendments impose a change in the
classification of the sex offender, and such a change can be as dramatic as
registration requirements of once a year for ten years to every ninety days
for life. The S.B. 10 amendments also impose severe criminal penalties for
failure to comply with reporting requirements.164 Also, a sex offender
cannot live within one thousand feet of a school or day care center.165 These
changes strengthen the argument that S.B. 10 is not remedial in nature. As
Justice Lanzinger stated, “[t]hese restraints on liberty are the consequences
of specific criminal convictions and should be recognized as part of the
punishment that is imposed as a result of the offender’s actions.”166 The
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changes made by S.B. 10 should be seen as affecting substantive rights, and
consequently should be found to violate the retroactivity clause of the Ohio
Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Laws such as the Adam Walsh Act and Ohio’s S.B. 10 are viewed
by society as the solution to the public’s prevailing view that sex offenses
are rising and that sex offenders are lurking behind every corner. Studies
have shown that in the last decade actual sex offenses have been declining
while news media coverage has been increasing.167 This means news stories
are not in response to more sex offenses, but rather in response to the
public’s interest in stories about sex offenders.168 Further, legislation such
as the Adam Walsh Act and Ohio’s S.B. 10 are often passed without
question because no politician can reasonably object to sex offender
legislation and still be re-elected. Sex offender legislation is a political tool
in which political candidates vow to crack down on sex offenders while at
the same time accusing their opponent of being too soft on pedophiles.169
Those in political office then exaggerate sex offender statistics to gain
support for more stringent legislation to fix the problem and promote their
political image.
The problem currently arising in Ohio as well as other states is that
sex offender laws are becoming more restrictive despite the fact that there is
no empirical evidence supporting such actions. When the Ohio General
Assembly rushed to pass S.B. 10 to receive a bonus in funding and to crack
down on sex offenders, it did not carefully weigh the constitutional
implications of such an overbearing law. The Adam Walsh Act and Ohio’s
S.B. 10 are designed to protect children from the tragic but rare sexual
assault committed by a stranger. However, children are far more likely to be
abducted or sexually assaulted by a family member or someone they already
know.170 This fact undermines the central foundation upon which sex
offender registration is built—the need to protect society against the
unidentified, looming sex offender.171
In times of misguided fear and paranoia, it is the responsibility of
the courts to stand up to the legislatures and uphold the constitutions at both
the state and federal levels. The Ohio General Assembly’s passage of S.B.
10 was an attempt to create a remedial measure that effectively protects
children; however, in reality, it only succeeded in increasing the punishment
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for past, present, and future sex offenders. In the next several years, the
constitutionality of S.B. 10 will come before the Ohio Supreme Court just as
the constitutionality of H.B. 180 came before the Ohio Supreme Court in
Cook. Since the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Cook, the S.B. 10
amendments have dramatically changed Ohio’s sex offender registration
laws, and may have edged the retroactive application of such laws closer to
violating both the United States and Ohio Constitutions. S.B. 10 litigation
will raise a number of constitutional issues, but ultimately the Ohio Supreme
Court will have to decide between reinforcing society’s misguided fear and
paranoia or upholding the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
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